Each year, Ghana’s Computerised School Selection and Placement System (CSSPS) allocates senior high school places after the Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE). In 2026, almost nine in ten qualified candidates were placed automatically. For some candidates, however, placement was not automatic, and their families searched for schools. Demand added to the pressure, with about four candidates choosing a Category A school for every available place.
This article argues that placement functions as a second examination, one sat by households and, in practice, largely by mothers. Drawing on official figures and on literature on administrative burden, school choice, maternal investment, emotional labour and gender-responsive budgeting, it advances three propositions. First, computerisation automates the routine case and returns the exception to the household, where it is resolved through travel, queuing and negotiation. Second, the burden is doubly regressive: it concentrates on candidates with the weakest results, who come disproportionately from under-resourced schools, and the burden is on women whose earnings are lost by the hour. Third, the gains in girls’ access to secondary education, visible in the 2026 figures, partly depend on women’s unpaid time, a cost that no placement indicator records.
The article concludes with proposals to measure the cost of placement, design for the exception, leverage established women’s communities to ensure that information reaches women directly, close the space in which brokers operate, and recognise mothers as institutional partners in educational progression.
Keywords: administrative burden; school placement; CSSPS; unpaid care work; emotional labour; gender-responsive budgeting; Ghana
Introduction: The Second Examination
In September and October 2026, news reports and social media carried images from school placement centres across Ghana. Fathers and guardians were present, and their effort deserves acknowledgement. The faces that recurred were women holding result slips, waiting in lines, checking vacancy lists, asking questions and pressing officials for options. These women were not all there for the same reason. Some had children whose BECE results were short of expectations. Even so, they stayed. Others had children who needed to resolve placement issues. Their effort was neither passive nor incidental; it was deliberate, informed and costly.
This article therefore treats those scenes as evidence. Its central claim is simple. The BECE examines the child, but placement examines the household. It tests whether a family can read the system, reach its offices, wait through its queues and argue its case. In 2026, mothers, to a striking degree, took the second examination.
The sections that follow read the placement figures through this lens and address two questions. Why do women bear this burden? What gendered costs remain invisible in official accounts of placement?
Reading the 2026 Figures Differently
At first glance, the 2026 figures describe a system working at scale: more than 620,000 candidates sat the BECE, and almost nine in ten of those who qualified were placed automatically (Ghanaian Times, 2026a). The same figures also tell a story.
It begins with the numbers. For every place available in a Category A school, approximately four candidates selected that school as their first choice (Adams, 2026). At least three out of every four candidates may not secure their first-choice school, regardless of how well they perform.
Girls made up just over half of the candidates placed, which is a success worth celebrating. That success, however, comes at a cost that the figures do not capture. Where mothers did much of the work securing those places, children’s progress has come at the expense of women’s unpaid time. Evidence shows that men in Ghana contribute about a third of the time women devote to unpaid household and care work, 49 minutes a day against 147 minutes (Ntow, 2026).
Furthermore, some candidates were not placed automatically, and their families searched for schools (Adams, 2026; Ghanaian Times, 2026b). Many had weak results in English or Mathematics, a pattern linked to under-resourced schools and household hardship (Saviour et al., 2022). Families with the most placement work to do are therefore, on average, the families with the least time and money to spare for it. The burden is regressive twice over: first in who receives a weak result, and second in who must then absorb the cost of finding an alternative.
The Digitisation Paradox
The CSSPS was introduced to make placement fairer and more transparent, and for most candidates it does so silently. The difficulty lies at the margins. Stakeholders reported limited understanding of the system, placement outside selected schools, and a need for better public education (Babah et al., 2020). An algorithm handles the routine case efficiently, but the exception (the unplaced candidate, the mismatch, the appeal) is returned to the household. It is resolved in the least digital way possible: in person, in a queue, through repeated visits.
This is the digitisation paradox. Automation reduces visible administrative work, while reallocating the residual work to citizens. Herd and Moynihan (2018) argue that administrative burdens are seldom accidents; they are policy choices, made explicitly or by default, that determine who bears the cost of reaching public services. Seen in this way, the women in the queues of 2026 were doing the placement system’s unfinished work, and they were doing it without pay. Moreover, Lipsky (2010) showed how frontline officials ration public services through their daily discretion. Reviewing 165 studies, Edri-Peer and Cohen (2025) found that how officials cope with pressure is influenced by organisational and environmental conditions and not individual disposition, which makes rationing a matter of system design. Leonardi et al. (2024) add that street-level theory has been applied largely in northern Europe and the United States, and that its extension to African, Asian and South American settings is recent. At placement centres, mothers acted as unofficial counterparts on the citizen’s side of the desk, tracking cases, gathering documents, interpreting rules and returning until the matter was resolved.
Why Women Step Forward
The prominence of women in this process is consistent with the evidence. Dimova and Fielding (2025) associate women’s empowerment in Ghana with better decisions about children’s education, consistent with women placing, on average, greater value on these outcomes. Experimental evidence points in the same direction. In a long-term randomised secondary school scholarship programme in Ghana, Duflo et al. (2024) found that children of women who received scholarships benefited, unlike those of male recipients. This suggests that a mother’s education carries particular weight in her children’s outcomes.
Social norms place schooling within the domain of care, which most Ghanaian households assign to women (Ntow, 2026). Fathers frequently handle school fees and other financial commitments, while mothers carry the continuous work of follow-up (Ntow, 2026), a division also documented in Kenya (Karisa, 2026). Placement falls on the care side of that division and it is treated as women’s work by default, requiring time, attention and persistence.
There is also a flexibility trap. Many women work in trading and other forms of self-employment, where hours appear flexible (Ghana Statistical Service, 2025). Institutions often read that flexibility as availability. In reality, an hour in a queue is an hour away from a stall, and the income is lost the same day. The apparent flexibility of women’s work therefore makes their time look cheaper to the system.
Information Is Not Navigation
A natural response to these issues would be to provide more information. The evidence advises caution. Ajayi (2024) shows that students from lower-performing junior high schools apply to less selective senior high schools than equally able peers elsewhere, which suggests that school context influences aspirations independently of ability. Moreover, Ajayi et al. (2020) found that information about the placement process was insufficient to change some students’ choices, and Sidibe and Ajayi (2024) show how imperfect information distorts applications. Davis (2026) adds that school performance information can deepen inequality when families differ in their ability to access, interpret and act on it.
The distinction that matters, therefore, is between information and navigation. Appadurai (2004) describes the capacity to aspire as a navigational capacity, unevenly distributed and strengthened through practice. Lareau (2011) shows how better-resourced parents engage institutions with confidence, negotiate on their children’s behalf and expect to be heard. An and Fiori (2024) find that these class differences in parental practice persist, although their strength varies by national setting. Li and Davies (2025) add that parent networks are the channel through which such know-how travels, and that network size counts for most in disadvantaged schools. Mothers at placement centres advocated without the networks, time or familiarity with bureaucracy that make it easier for others. Therefore, placement inequality arises from differences in the capacity to act on information and differences in ability or preference. In response, Adawurah et al. (2026) propose a multifactor framework to improve both the equity and the efficiency of placement in Ghana.
The Labour That Is Never Counted
Public administration scholars group these costs into three types: learning costs (finding out how the system works), compliance costs (meeting its requirements) and psychological costs (the stress and stigma of dealing with it). These costs weigh most heavily on those with fewer resources (Halling & Bækgaard, 2022; Herd & Moynihan, 2018). At the placement centres, the effects of these costs were visible in travel fares, waiting hours, lost trading income, repeated follow-up and the work of comforting a disappointed child.
That last element deserves particular attention. Hochschild (1983) defined emotional labour as the management of feeling to sustain a desired state of mind in others. Current measurement shows how unevenly this work falls. Vettoretto et al. (2026), surveying 2,309 mothers, found the emotional dimension of the mental load to be the one least affected by a partner’s available time, which suggests that it is the least redistributable. A mother in a placement queue manages two sets of emotions at once: her child’s sense of failure after a disappointing grade, and the anxiety she experiences when dealing with officials whose cooperation she needs. She must appear calm, courteous and hopeful, often for days. This labour protects the child’s self-belief in a fragile transition. However, it does not appear in the system’s accounts.
Pulignano and Domecka (2025) show how unpaid labour sustains inequality, and Pulignano et al. (2025) identify care undertaken for the sake of others as a defining feature of such work. Placement labour fits both descriptions. In addition, what goes unmeasured goes unfunded. Gender-responsive budgeting rests on the principle that public spending should account for differences in the costs borne by women and men (Rubin & Bartle, 2022). The placement system currently reports how many candidates were placed. It does not report what it cost families, and women in particular, to place them.
Brokers as a Price on Burden
Where official procedures are slow or unclear, a market for shortcuts develops. Brokers profit from citizens who cannot navigate official channels (della Porta & Vannucci, 2016), and such practices erode service delivery and public trust (Sokro, 2022). In 2026, the Ministry of Education urged parents to report anyone demanding money for placement (Ali, 2026). The broker’s offer is, in effect, a price on administrative burden: payment in exchange for certainty and saved time. Anxious mothers, already absorbing heavy time costs, are the most exposed to that offer. Reducing the burden is therefore also an anti-corruption measure, because a simpler process leaves brokers less to sell.
Towards Gender-Responsive Placement
If placement is a second examination, it should be fair to those who sit it. The following measures follow from the analysis.
- Measure the cost of placement. The CSSPS should collect sex-disaggregated data on who applies, appeals and seeks help on a child’s behalf, including the time, travel and expense involved. A simple cost-to-place indicator, reviewed through a gender lens, would make the household burden visible in planning and budgeting (Rubin & Bartle, 2022).
- Design for the exception. Most of the burden arises from unplaced and mismatched cases. Self-placement, appeals and vacancy information should be planned as core services, with clear timelines and named responsible officers.
- Take information to where women already gather. The Ghana Education Service should communicate vacancies, self-placement and appeals in local languages through radio and SMS, and through markets, women’s associations, faith groups and parent associations, in addition to online channels.
- Make resolution centres resolve. The Ministry has set up call centres and regional resolution centres (Avanu, 2026). Their value depends on adequate staffing, convenient hours, free calls and the authority to settle cases on the spot, so that parents are not sent from one office to another.
- Bring help to the district. Local government is where citizens meet the state most directly (Idowu, 2022). District help desks should offer appointments or ticketing, seating and shade, and should give priority to pregnant women, nursing mothers, persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups.
- Close the space for brokers. Government should enforce official channels, work through women’s networks and market leaders as trusted messengers. Provide safe, confidential channels for reporting anyone who demands money or favours in exchange for a school placement.
- Present alternatives as genuine pathways. Guidance on technical and vocational education and training (TVET) should present it as a credible route, free of stereotypes about which programmes suit girls or boys, so that a mother’s search for a school is not narrowed by assumptions about her child’s sex.
- Involve those who carry the burden. Women’s groups, parents (especially mothers) and school management committees should take part in each annual review of the system.
Conclusion
A grade is a moment; a mother’s persistence is a strategy. Ghana’s placement system depends on that persistence and has never accounted for it. The 2026 exercise shows that a computerised system can be efficient for the typical case while remaining costly for the families with the least room to absorb that cost. Furthermore, a child’s progress depends partly on women’s unpaid time and labour. Recognising this means measuring the second examination, reducing what it demands, and treating mothers as partners in their children’s progression, with a voice in how the system is designed.
To every woman who stood in those queues: we commend you. Your effort was seen, and it deserves to be counted.
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